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THE MORE THINGS CHANGE... :
SUPERFICIAL STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS AT THE NEW YORK COURT OF
APPEALS
James A. Gardner"
A state's separation of powers jurisprudence generally provides
a good indication of the condition of its state constitutional
adjudication. Because the federal Constitution is almost entirely
unconcerned with states' purely internal decisions concerning the
structure of state government,1 adjudication of separation of
powers issues under the state constitution is fully independent of
federal doctrine and occurs in something approaching its purest
form. The New York Court of Appeals' decision last term in
Bourquin v. Cuomo,2 a separation of powers case, thus reveals
starkly that the court's state constitutional adjudication is in poor
shape.
Bourquin concerned the constitutionality of a 1991 Executive
Order issued by then-Governor Mario Cuomo which authorized
the creation of a Citizens Utility Board (CUB), a private, non-
profit organization intended to represent the interests of
residential utility customers in proceedings before the Public
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A
version of this paper was originally presented at the Conference on State
Constitutional Law: Adjudication and Reform, on March 1, 1996 at the
Government Law Center, Albany Law School. In the interest of full
disclosure, I wish to state that the executive order upheld by the Court of
Appeals in Bourquin v. Cuomo, a decision which I criticize below, was drafted
by my wife when she was Assistant Counsel to Governor Cuomo.
1. Because no individual rights are concerned, the Fourteenth
Amendment is irrelevant and there is no federal "floor" to contend with. Nor
do the kinds of policy considerations that sometimes favor uniformity in the
individual rights area arise here. Cf., e.g., State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202
(Or. 1974). Perhaps the only federal constitutional provision that might apply
is the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, but that clause is not
judicially enforceable against the states. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1
(1849).
2. 85 N.Y.2d 781, 652 N.E.2d 171, 628 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1995).
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Utilities Commission. 3 The Executive Order also directed state
agencies to permit the CUB to include its literature, at its
expense, in up to four state mailings each year. 4 The Governor
had originally sought legislative approval for the creation of such
an entity, but upon the legislature's refusal decided to proceed
independently. 5 The court upheld the Executive Order against a
claim that it violated the separation of powers under the state
constitution.
Drawing primarily on several earlier decisions, the Court of
Appeals held that separation of powers requires that "the
Legislature make the critical policy decisions, while the
Executive Branch's responsibility is to implement those
policies. '' 6 Although no statute authorized the Governor to issue
this particular Executive Order, the legislature had elsewhere
expressed the desire that the interests of New York consumers be
protected, and had implemented that desire by creating the
Consumer Protection Board and directing it to "'promote and
encourage the protection of the legitimate interests of consumers
3. Id. at 783, 652 N.E.2d at 172, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 619. Throughout its
opinion, the court treats the Executive Order as though it actually authorizes
the creation of the CUB, which the court seems to view almost as though it
were some kind of executive branch agency. In fact, the Executive Order
makes clear that the CUB is a purely private, voluntary membership
organization, see Exec. Order No. 141, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REOS. tit.
9, § 4.141, 1 (1991), for which gubernatorial "authorization" is unnecessary.
The only governmental action authorized by the Executive Order is the
granting of access to state mailings. Exec. Order No. 141, N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.141, 3 (1991). My analysis of the court's
opinion in the following discussion treats the CUB as the Court of Appeals
conceived it, even though the Court's decision may rest on a misconception of
the nature of the CUB.
4. Exec. Order No. 141, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.141
(1991).
5. See, e.g., Frank J. Prial, Cuomo Fosters New Opposition to Utility
Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1991, at B2; Josh Barbanel, State Considers
Consumer Board, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1983, at 37.
6. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 785, 652 N.E.2d at 173, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
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within the state.'" 7 Consequently, the Court of Appeals ruled,
the Governor's action did no more than implement an officially
declared legislative policy - an unremarkable example of the
state executive carrying out his constitutional responsibility to
execute the law. 8
The court's decision in Bourquin adopts an extremely
expansive interpretation of executive power - far more
expansive, for example, than executive power under the federal
Constitution. Under the court's approach, the Governor may
"execute" the law by issuing executive orders that carry out
abstractly expressed legislative policy goals not only in ways
expressly directed by the legislature, but also in ways which the
legislature has not directed, and in fact has actually rejected. 9
Of course, there is nothing wrong with such a ruling in
principle; states are free to grant their governors extremely broad
powers arising from expansive notions of the reach of positive
law and of what it means to execute the law. Nevertheless, the
court's decision is problematic in two ways. First, the court
makes no attempt to justify this broad view of executive power.
That by itself would not be so bad if it were not for the second
problem: the New York Constitution is full of indications,
7. Id. at 785-86, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (quoting N.Y.
ExEc. LAw § 553(2)(b) (McKinney 1982)).
8. Id. at 785-87, 652 N.E.2d at 173-175, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 620-22.
9. Cf. e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (stating that the President lacks authority to take action expressly
considered and rejected by Congress; to do so amounts to usurpation of
legislative function); American Power and Light Co. v. Securities & Exch.
Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90 (1946) (holding that Congress may not authorize the
President to act by providing direction so vague that a reviewing court is
unable to determine what the legislative policy is and what agency is to
implement it); Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566
(D.D.C. 1986) (holding that the President cannot by executive order interfere
with specific legislative directives); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
706 (1977) (stating that courts must set aside government actions not in
accordance with law). But see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981) (sustaining executive order that, although not specifically authorized by
Congress, is consistent with congressional policies expressed in other statutes
not directly applicable).
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completely ignored by the court, that gubernatorial power should
be construed narrowly.
The Court of Appeals based its interpretation of the Governor's
power on Article IV, § 1 of the New York Constitution, which
provides: "The executive power shall be vested in the governor.
."10 Had the court read further into the document, it would
have found that the language of Article IV is a considerable
overstatement: in fact, the executive power of the state is vested
not only in the Governor, but also in the Attorney General, 11 the
Comptroller, 12 the District Attorneys 13 and the Sheriffs 14 -- all
independently elected officials in no way answerable to the
Governor. The most logical explanation for this splintering of
executive power is surely a distrust of the executive -- a distrust
not shared by the framers of the federal Constitution, who
believed the President would be weak, 15 and who therefore had
no qualms about vesting all executive power in a single official. 16
Most state constitutions provide for a division of executive
power among independently elected executive branch officials
much like New York's. Typically, executive power was divided
during the Progressive reform era of the late nineteenth century;
by and large, these reforms reflect an extreme distrust of
concentrated executive power because of its potential for
corruption. 17  In New York, however, this distrust has
considerably older roots. The 1777 constitution, after an
extensive preamble reciting the offenses of the King, provided
that most executive branch officials were to be appointed by the
10. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 784, 652 N.E.2d at 173, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 620
(citing N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
11. Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1).
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(a)).
14. Id.
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (Madison).
16. During the constitutional convention, the Framers debated and rejected
a proposal for a multimember executive council. See James Madison, NOTES
OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 46-47, 58-60, 357, 523
(Adrienne Koch ed. 1987).
17. See, e.g., James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State
Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L. J. 819 (1991).
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legislature. 18 The 1821 constitution provided for legislative
appointment of the secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer,
surveyor-general and commissary-general, 19 and popular election
of the sheriffs. 20 Under the 1846 constitution, legislative
appointments were eliminated in favor of popular election of the
secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, attorney general, state
surveyor, canal commissioners and inspectors of state prisons. 2 1
Thus, in New York the Governor was not stripped of these
powers - he never had them in the first place. A plausible
explanation of this history, it seems to me, is either that the
powers wielded by these officials were never considered
"executive" powers in New York,2 2 or that New Yorkers were
always extremely suspicious of concentrated executive power.
Either way, there is a good case to be made that executive power
should presumptively be narrowly construed.
Other aspects of the constitutional structure of New York
government suggest caution in interpreting the powers of the
Governor. For example, whereas the executive is full-time, the
legislature is part-time, a potentially serious disadvantage.
Likewise, the Governor's item-veto power2 3 gives him a
substantial degree of influence over the content of legislation that
might counsel against broadening his powers in other ways.
18. N.Y. CONST. pmbl, arts. 22, 23, 26 (1777), reprinted in THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTITUTIONs 2623 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed. 1909)
[hereinafter "Thorpe"].
19. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1821), reprinted in Thorpe, supra note 18,
at 2644.
20. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (1821), reprinted in Thorpe, supra note 18,
at 2645.
21. N.Y. CONST. art. V, §§ 1-4 (1846), reprinted in Thorpe, supra note
18, at 2680-81.
22. The nature of executive power is by no means fixed and certain. For
example, the prosecutorial function may be considered executive, as in the
Federal Constitution, see, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), or
judicial, see, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 173 (1890) (placing state attorney
general in judicial branch). See Scott M. Matheson, Constitutional Status and
Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POLCY 1 (1993);
Stephanie A.J. Dange, Note, Is Prosecuting a Core Executive Function?
Morrison v. Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990).
23. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
1996]
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Moreover, the Court of Appeals seems to have given no thought
to the ways in which the executive order at issue in Bourquin
altered the degree of influence exercised by the legislative and
executive branches over the substance of consumer protection.
The law cited by the court provided for the creation of the
Consumer Protection Board, an agency subject to oversight by
standing legislative committees, 24 and whose executive director is
confirmed by the Senate. 25 The Governor's executive order, by
contrast, created an entity wholly free from any kind of
legislative oversight or control.
I do not wish to be misunderstood to say that these
considerations mean that the decision in Bourquin was necessarily
wrong. On the contrary, there might well be good explanations
for the court's views and good reasons to think that the
considerations I have outlined here mean something other than
what I have suggested. The problem with the court's decision,
however, is that it did not give any such explanations or reasons.
It merely imported a set of bromides about the separation of
powers from federal doctrine26 and applied them to the New
York constitution as though it were identical to the federal
Constitution. It is disappointing that years of criticism have had
no discernible impact on the court's state constitutional
adjudication except in the most highly visible cases involving
individual rights. When the court's separation of powers
jurisprudence is as careful and self-conscious as its best
individual rights decisions, then will the court have made
significant progress.
24. Both the Senate and Assembly have standing committees devoted to
consumer protection. See New York Senate, Rules of the Senate, 1990, Rule
VII, § 1 (establishing standing Consumer Protection Committee); New York
State Assembly, Rules of the Assembly, 1989, Rule IV, § 1 (establishing
standing Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee).
25. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 551 (McKinney 1982).
26. If anything has changed in the last decade, it is that the Court of
Appeals has gotten more sophisticated about hiding its reliance on federal
doctrine. Compare Bourquin, in which the court cites directly to a federal
decision only once with Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482
N.E.2d 1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985), in which the court unself-consciously
copies federal doctrine wholesale.
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